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Introduction. 
 
What is it about the Europeanisation of British monetary policy that merits attention? 
From a superficial glance at the subject, one might conclude: ‘not a lot’. In policy 
terms, this Europeanisation process as represented by sterling’s membership of the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) appears to have lasted a mere two years. 
As is often the case, Britain joined late (October 1990), found the experiment an 
uncomfortable experience before crashing out spectacularly in September 1992. Since 
then, while paying lip-service to future membership if the euro, the Treasury, first 
under Lamont, then Clarke and Brown, has gone about carefully constructing a 
domestic institutional framework for confronting issues and problems in this 
particular policy area. Those commentators who predicted that New Labour would 
join the Single Currency in its first term, have been forced to revise these arguments.  
 
However, a slightly closer look at this topic reveals a different dimension to this story. 
Since the 1970s, a number of British policy-makers have been continually attracted to 
the idea of Europe providing a solution to continual difficulties experienced in the   2 
area of monetary policy. In this context, a gradual enthusiasm for ERM membership 
developed in the first half of the 1980s, to the point where a majority of Conservative 
Cabinet ministers became supportive by 1985. Frustrated by Thatcher’s veto of the 
policy at this time, Lawson went on to covertly shadow the Deutschmark (DM) in the 
late 1980s before Thatcher finally relented in 1990 (Thompson, 1996). Since 1992, 
while politicians and officials in Whitehall have been sceptical of the case for 
sterling’s membership of the Single Currency, it is possible to find a similar 
constituency of opinion in favour, including the present Prime Minister. Britain may 
have only formally taken part in European monetary institutions for two years, but 
this picture does not accurately reflect the strength of feeling concerning the 
Europeanisation of monetary policy in some quarters of the British Establishment.  
 
These opening comments raise issues that have only been touched on briefly in the 
workshop discussions so far. First this case study of monetary policy suggests that 
Europeanisation may not necessarily be a gradual, incremental or linear process that 
increasingly affects domestic politics as the scope of European integration grows 
wider. Rather, its trajectory may be much more uneven: it might be halted or even 
reversed in some instances. Second, the case study of monetary policy highlights the 
obvious (but not much commented on) fact that the impact of Europeanisation can be 
controversial and divisive one in British politics. These two issues are not mutually 
exclusive. Indeed, in many ways they are related, as we shall see.  
 
This paper attempts to do three things. It begins by charting the rise and fall of the 
Europeanisation of British monetary policy over the last two decades or so. It goes on 
to ask why the Europeanisation of British monetary policy (in the form of ERM 
membership) became so controversial in the 1990s. Finally, it concludes by asking 
whether there is a connection between the events of Black Wednesday and present 
Treasury reluctance to join the euro. The main argument developed below is that 
Europeanisation took place initially as a method of depoliticising British economic 
management (taking the politics out of policy-making). However, it became 
controversial because it was criticised for locking policy-makers into a course of 
action which appeared to set them at odds with the demands of many of the electorate. 
Put another way, objections to Europeanisation in this case were as much to do with 
democracy (or a particular understanding of democracy) rather than sovereignty. The   3 
Blair Government has continued to resist membership of the euro because it too 
perceived the institutions of the eurozone to be too rigid and remote from political 
interference. To join is to once again risk being tied to a policy which may threaten 
the legitimacy of the party in office.  
 
 
Conceptualising Europeanisation.  
 
It is not the intention of this paper to re-rehearse the arguments already presented by 
Buller and Gamble concerning the conceptualisation of Europeanisation. Suffice it to 
say that it remains the author’s position that any definition should be sensitive to the 
following issues. First, it should be internally consistent, in the sense that the 
properties of Europeanisation (its intension) should be logically related to the 
phenomena it is trying to explain (its extension). Second, the conceptual boundaries of 
Europeanisation should be as sharp as possible, showing how it is differentiated from 
other related concepts. Finally, the concept should be a genuine addition to the 
semantic field surrounding the subject area, not merely an alternative label for the 
same thing (something which may cause confusion).  
 
This paper sticks closely to earlier definitions of Europeanisation (albeit with some 
differences) used in earlier workshop discussions by conceptualising it as: 
 
‘a process whereby the domestic politics of a country is significantly affected by 
distinct EU structures of governance and policy-making’. 
 
The phrases ‘domestic politics’ and ‘EU structures of governance and policy-making’ 
are deliberately designed to be broad, referring both to observable behaviour as well 
as non-observable factors such as ideas, beliefs and culture. Inclusion of the word 
‘distinct’ reminds us of the problem of external differentiation. The EU is of course a 
relatively autonomous organisation, but it is still influenced significantly by the 
behaviour of external entities such as member states and broader global trends. We 
need to be clear that when we refer to Europeanisation, we are not just talking about 
domestic and international forces ‘passing through’ Brussels without being affected 
by the institutions and processes of the EU. Finally, the word ‘significantly’ is   4 
intended to discriminate between important and minor change that takes place at the 
domestic level as the result of Europeanisation. Of course, the question of how we 
distinguish significant and non-significant effects is a difficult one. However, without 
such differentiation, there is a danger that the concept and causal properties of 
Europeanisation will become trivialised as it is used to explain every little domestic 
alternation which results from the EU, no matter how small. 
 
Of course, the process of Europeanisation will still reflect both top-down pressure 
from EU institutions and the ‘bottom-up’ strategies of member states (or more likely, 
a combination of the two). Ontologically, then, Europeanisation is a multi-levelled 
phenomenon and, as such, differs little from the process of European integration. 
What appears to makes Europeanisation distinct as a field of enquiry is its analytical 
focus. Here, the primary concern is to chart the impact of the European on the 
domestic (something that European integration theories have largely, but not totally 
neglected). Interestingly, as first glance, this case study appears to defy the top-down, 
bottom-up debate concerning how Europeanisation takes place. Rather ERM (and 
euro membership if and when Britain joins) appears to reflect a process whereby 
British politicians ‘reached up’ to the EU level and selected a policy for 
implementation at the domestic level. Britain had little decisive influence on the 
design of the ERM in the late 1970s (see Ludlow, 1982), so in no sense does 
membership represent the exporting of a domestic initiative from the bottom-up. At 
the same time, it cannot be said that Brussels in any sense imposed this policy from 
the top-down.  
 
 
The Europeanisation of British Monetary Policy: the Rise and Fall of a 
Depoliticisation Governing Strategy. 
 
How might we explain the Europeanisation of British monetary policy? One approach 
might be to highlight the influence of certain economic ideas that become influential 
the relevant policy community at the right time. In this sense, ERM membership 
became attractive to an increasing number of policy-makers in Whitehall in the 1980s 
because it was perceived to provide the ‘best’ solution to a set of policy problems that 
had emerged at this time. It would be crass to deny the general validity of such an   5 
argument. It seems inconceivable that a group of policy-makers would select a policy 
solution that they did not think would at least be a marginal improvement on the 
existing situation. In short, new policies when formulated and implemented, reflect 
the relative influence of the prevailing set of economic ideas at the time – usually with 
some sort of time lag (Hall, 1989). 
 
The problem with this sort of argument is that most economic ideas and policies are 
‘essentially contested’ by the epistemic communities which propound them. 
Membership of the ERM was no different in this sense. It follows that the nature of 
economic advice facing ministers would have been divided and a choice would have 
had to have been made between ERM membership and the competing alternatives. 
The problem then becomes: on what grounds do politicians make such choices? The 
argument below is that ‘governance’ considerations played an important role in this 
case study. More particularly, Europeanisation was encouraged as a ‘policy support’ 
for a broader strategy of depoliticisation that already existed in this area. 
Depoliticisation has been defined as: ‘…the process of placing at one remove the 
political character of decision-making…’ (Burnham, 2001). It reflects the motivations 
and actions of a governing elite: in this case, party leaders, their advisers and top civil 
servants (see also Bulpitt, 1986; Buller, 2000. For an alternative Marxist approach, 
see Bonefeld, Brown and Burnham, 1995; Burnham, 2000). 
 
In the context of monetary policy, depoliticisation serves two broad functions. As 
Burnham (2001) has argued, depoliticisation seeks: ‘…to change market expectations 
regarding the effectiveness and credibility of policy-making’. Such a strategy may 
become attractive against a backdrop of opinion which displays a loss of faith in the 
ability of politicians to ‘steer’ the economy. This may be because they lack the 
knowledge or technical expertise to implement many of the tasks expected of them. 
Even worse, the public may suspect that politicians will abuse what little knowledge 
they have for their own gain rather than the pursuit of the national interest. In such a 
climate, the best way for a government to promote an image of credibility and 
competence is to take (or appear to take) the politics out of policy-making. 
 
Second, depoliticisation, ‘…helps to shield the party in office from the consequences 
of unpopular policies’ (Burnham, 2001). Policy-makers may not only be concerned   6 
with power. They may not always attempts to control or resolve problems in the face 
of opposition. They may confront some issues that are intractable, even with perfect 
information. Others may be so controversial that new policy initiatives may make 
things worse rather than improve matters. In this sense, a more ‘rational’ strategy 
might be to devolve responsibility for policy onto other groups or organisations and 
let them take the political heat. However, depoliticisation is a more subtle and 
complicated process than this. Attempting to place at one remove ‘the political 
character’ of decision-making is not quite the same as a fully-blown act of devolution. 
More often than not, politicians will want to retain an ultimate stake in policy, just in 
case things go wrong and the strategy has to be reversed. It follows that while 
depoliticisation is ultimately a deliberate political ploy, we as researchers need to 
make a distinction between the reality of this act and the rhetoric that surrounds it.  
 
In short, the Depoliticisation interpretation implies that policy is not always important 
in its own right. At times, policy initiatives may need to be considered in the context 
of broader governance strategies, which themselves take place within particular 
institutional environments. Put in different terms, Europeanisation as a process may 
be instrumental to those that encourage it in the sense that it will be used partly to put 
a more positive gloss on cruder governing beliefs and techniques. In one sense, this 
observation is a statement of the obvious. British politicians (like their counterparts on 
the Continent) will try to manipulate the EU policy process in a way that compliments 
their domestic position. However, this discussion raises an additional and arguably 
more important point. It may not only be necessary to disaggregate the effect of 
Europeanisation at the domestic level, but to consider how there various domestic 
factors are related. If these factors are related, are some more important than others? 
If so, how might such a conclusion affect academic judgements concerning the 
importance of the domestic impact of Europeanisation?  
 
If Europeanisation in this area should be partly understood as a policy support for a 
more general strategy of depoliticisation, it was not the only, or indeed the first 
instrument employed to achieve this governing objective. Indeed, initial attempts to 
secure the depoliticisation of economic management rested on a ‘domestic’ 
framework represented by the twin ideas of sound money and free markets. Of course, 
the official rhetoric usually stressed a different message. In particular, the Thatcher   7 
Government after 1979 was adamant that policies based on this neo-liberal ideology 
would increase the efficiency and productivity of the British economy, thereby 
reducing decades of relative decline. No longer would governments attempt to create 
growth and jobs through the manipulation of demand (as Keynesian doctrines had 
prescribed). In future, these tasks would be devolved onto groups operating within the 
British economy. This was not to say that the government had no role at all. Ministers 
accepted that they had a duty to provide a nominal framework capable of generating 
low and stable inflationary conditions for British business. Moreover, they 
acknowledged that specific measures might have to be undertaken to remove any 
‘restrictive practices’ hindering the freedom of individual firms. In this context, the 
rolling programme of industrial relations reforms unveiled in the 1980s and 1990s 
was probably the most controversial.  
 
As already suggested, behind this message lay additional political, or governance 
considerations. Faced with the long-standing nature of many of Britain’s economic 
problems, this neo-liberal economic philosophy was also attractive as a way of 
depoliticising the conduct of economic management. Perhaps the key feature of this 
strategy was the adoption of a rule-based regime for monetary policy. Monetarism 
stipulated that there was a direct relationship between inflation and the level of the 
money supply circulating around the economy, not the wage rises achieved by the 
unions. This policy was operationalised by the Medium Term Financial Strategy 
(MTFS), which contained pre-publicised and centrally defined targets or rules for the 
growth of £M3, as well as interest rates and public expenditure. Gone was the need 
for an incomes policy and the continuous wrangling between politicians and unions 
over various pay norms, ‘going rates’, differentials and ‘special cases’. Instead, 
monetary policy could be reduced to the ‘technical’ task of monitoring and controlling 
the money supply in the institutional confines of the Treasury. In short, this rule-based 
framework reduced the need for political choice or discretion on the part of 
politicians. The less the need for discretion, the less the danger of policy mistakes 
being made (or of politicians being blamed if they did). That was the theory at least 
(see Kydland, Edward & Prescott, 1977; Barrow & Gordon, 1983; Browning, 1986: 
261).  
   8 
One of the earliest indications that political leaders were aware of the advantages of 
this rule-based strategy could be found in the Conservative Party’s policy paper, The 
Right Approach to the Economy (1977): 
 
Monetary targets, openly proclaimed and explained, can have a crucial effect in 
reducing inflationary expectations. The extent of that influence will depend on 
increasing public awareness. The monetary authorities will often be subject, 
directly and indirectly, to political and industrial pressures to modify and relax 
their policies, frequently for reasons of short-term expediency. The dangers of 
yielding to such pressures will be reduced if monetary policy is the subject of 
regular and open public discussion, and if the authorities are expected as a 
matter of course to give account of their conduct of policy and of their 
objectives for the future (Howe, et. al., 1977: 9). 
 
Writing fifteen years later, Lawson spoke in similar terms: 
 
governments that believe in unfettered discretion are likely to be led astray by 
short-term pressures and the politically expedient. A government that simply 
reacts to the pressure of events is likely to make more mistakes than one 
constrained by rules embodying experience accumulated over a long period 
(Lawson, 1992, pp.66-67; 1021; and 1040).  
 
Indeed, Lawson (1992: p.1025) went further: ‘A government of rules…is less 
intrusive and – in the long run – more acceptable to the public at large than a 
government of men’. 
 
While there is evidence to suggest that, by the mid-1980s the public had grudgingly 
acquiesced in their acceptance of these policies (Butler and Kavanagh, 1984; Crewe, 
1988), the Conservative leadership was experiencing significant problems operating 
monetarism. Both Howe and Lawson had real difficulties in establishing a reliable 
relationship between the level of money supply and the rate of inflation. Targets for 
£M3 were consistently missed, yet inflation was brought down to three per cent. One 
of the Treasury’s responses was to gradually take into account the importance of the 
exchange rate when trying to achieve price stability. By the March 1981 budget,   9 
monetary policy was gradually being relaxed in an attempt to bring down the high 
value of the pound which was squeezing inflation, but also pricing British exporters 
out of international markets. However, exchange rate management also faced 
implementation problems as sterling oscillated wildly on the currency markets. In 
June 1984, the pound was dragged upwards in the wake of a rising dollar, boosted by 
figures showing a significant rise in economic growth. By July 1985, sterling was 
falling to $1.10 after Ingham had let it slip that Thatcher would let the pound slip to 
$1 if that was what the markets decreed. 
 
What was it about EMS membership that was so attractive in these circumstances? At 
its most basic, the collapse of monetarism meant the Conservative leadership needed 
an alternative policy to try and control inflation. As noted above, exchange rate 
management had become an increasingly prominent instrument in implementing this 
objective. However, it was felt that EMS membership and the adoption of a public 
target would lend this policy more credibility, while at the same time helping to 
counter the threat of currency speculation as markets attempted to discover the ceiling 
and floor of an implicit rate. Just as important were the support arrangements that 
existed as part of the constitution of the EMS (strengthened as a result of the Basle-
Nybourg Agreement). In the past, central banks had intervened in the markets and 
credit had been provided to a country whose currency was in danger of breaching its 
margins of fluctuation in the parity grid. Lawson was aware that this help was not 
automatic. Indeed, Whitehall experienced problems first hand in December 1987 
when the Bundesbank made it difficult for the British authorities to buy DM’s in 
support of sterling (Lawson, 1992, pp. 786-91). That said, there remained a general 
optimism that once Britain was actually in the system, the pound would receive 
institutional support in the event of a sterling crisis.  
 
If monetarism had been introduced partly as a rule-based policy designed to discipline 
public expectations and de-politicise the conduct of economic management, ERM 
membership also offered an alternative framework at ‘one remove’. As far back as 
1981, Lawson was writing about the governing benefits of such a policy in these 
terms. In a memorandum to Howe, Lawson distinguished between two types of 
financial discipline needed to contain the demands of societal groups and control 
inflation. The Conservative leadership could operate a self-imposed explicit monetary   10 
target, as it was doing at the time, or an externally imposed exchange rate discipline. 
Although Lawson at this time preferred the former, he ruminated out loud whether the 
latter might not be more effective, especially on those Conservative backbenchers 
who had made it known that they were less than enamoured by the initial results of 
the monetarist experiment: 
 
...those of our colleagues who are most likely to be pressing for the relaxation of 
monetary discipline, are those that are keenest on the UK joining the EMS 
(European Monetary System). In other words, we turn their swords against them 
(Lawson, 1992, pp.111-12; 1058; see also Scott, 1986, p.198; Howe, 1994, 
p.639). 
 
Or as Samuel Brittan put it in an article for the Financial Times: 
 
We are back with the need for some kind of constitutional break on the politics 
of excessive expectations and over-promising…The only way of injecting some 
credibility into counter-inflationary policy is an exchange rate objective; and the 
only one available is the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary 
System (quoted in Scott, 1986; p.98). 
 
Similar governing calculations were being made by the Labour leadership at this time, 
particularly a small group consisting of Kinnock, Smith, Eatwell and Brown. This 
elite accepted the argument that increased processes of economic and financial 
liberalisation now placed significant constraints on the operations of a future Labour 
Government. More particularly it was feared that any attempts to stimulate the 
economy through demand management would be penalised by adverse movements in 
global financial markets. In this context, what the leadership required was a new 
policy framework that would constrain the expectations of supporters and convince 
opinion that there would be no return to the short-term discretionary policies 
associated with the party in office in the 1960s and the 1970s. ERM appeared to offer 
an ideal solution to this problem: this external institution would ‘tie the hands’ of 
Labour politicians and keep them on the financial ‘straight and narrow’. It is also 
noticeable that at this time, many of the interventionist industrial policies that had 
been developed by the party during the policy reviews of the mid-1980s were now   11 
gradually abandoned (McSmith, 1993, ch. 13; Wickham-Jones, 1995; Eatwell, 1992; 
Radice, 1989). 
 
If Europeanisation in this area was an alternative policy support for a broader 
depoliticisation strategy designed to shore up the Conservative Party’s reputation for 
governing competence, ejection from the ERM in September 1992 heralded its 
failure. The issue of why this policy failed is not the primary concern of this paper. 
Instead, the discussion below is structured around two different but related questions. 
First, why was the failure of this policy so controversial? After all, Europeanisation in 
this case was supposed to take the politics out of policy-making? Yet as some senior 
figures were to admit later, the Conservatives never enjoyed the same public 
confidence as they did before ‘Black Wednesday’, (Major, 1999; p.334-35; Seldon, 
1997). Second, is there any link between the controversy surrounding this episode and 
the Blair Government’s non-decision on euro membership? If so, what is the precise 
nature of this connection? Why has the Europeanisation of British monetary policy 
been halted (reversed?) in this particular policy area? 
 
Approaching the question of why some policies become controversial is not an easy 
task. There appears to be little in the way of a literature which explicitly addresses this 
topic and as a result, the following conclusions are very tentative. Perhaps the first 
point to make is that policy failure is not synonymous with controversy. As we have 
already seen, monetarism was quietly dropped after a period of unsatisfactory 
implementation, but this U-turn did not inflict lasting damage on the political 
reputation of the Thatcher Government. This observation implies that for policy 
failure to become controversial or politicised, it must also impinge on some broader 
feature of the political system deemed to be significant or important. The argument 
below suggests that Europeanisation in this case was controversial because it became 
tied up with questions of democratic legitimacy. 
 
There can be no doubt that part of the reason why Europeanisation had such a 
controversial impact in this area was because ERM membership generated perverse 
consequences for the conduct of domestic economic policy. At a time when the UK 
was heading into a recession, Lamont was forced to raise interest rates to preserve 
sterling’s parity with the DM: a decision that placed real strain on the financial   12 
positions of many companies and individual households. That said, many policies 
produce perverse consequences that adversely affect the welfare of the public. What 
was just as controversial was the image of a government boxed into a policy stance 
over which it had little or no control. Lamont himself describes the sense of 
impotence that he felt at the time: ‘I was playing a part in some drama that had been 
written for me. That was how it had to be and that was my pre-determined role’ 
(Lamont, 1999, p.255). How can we explain this situation?  
 
The Major Government could have sought a general revaluation of all currencies 
within the ERM to take the pressure off sterling. Indeed Lamont lobbied for such a re-
alignment but these efforts got nowhere. The Bundesbank was resistant to change 
because of worries about the inflationary consequences of any easing of policy. The 
French Government was just as opposed to a general revaluation because it would 
undermine the Franc-fort strategy which had become the centrepiece of economic 
policy after 1983. Just as important, however, was the fact that broader international 
and European developments had helped to solidify the structure of the ERM at this 
time. The destabilising effect of the fluctuating dollar in the second half of the 1980s, 
as well as worries about resurgent German power after re-unification and the ending 
of the Cold War, led member states to negotiate a three stage process towards 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). ERM membership represented Stage One of 
this progression towards the fixing of rates and the eventual abolition of European 
currencies. Whereas revaluations in the ERM had been possible in the past, it was 
likely that they would be much more difficult to achieve in this institutional climate.  
 
At the same time, some commentators bemoaned the failure of the Conservative 
Government to seek a devaluation of the pound (Stephens, 1996, pp.212-14; 219). 
Indeed, the way that Major and other senior party leaders seemed to treat ERM 
membership as a ‘badge of honour’ was noted with an increasing sense of incredulity. 
Looked at in simple policy terms, this behaviour does appear difficult to explain. 
However, once ERM membership is understood as part of a broader depoliticisation 
governing strategy, the logic underpinning Europeanisation in this instance demanded 
this type of response. The whole rationale of ERM membership was to guard against 
such short-term fine-tuning that societal pressure could encourage (especially after the   13 
failure of monetarism). Devaluation in this context was almost unthinkable; the image 
of a remote and unresponsive elite was almost inevitable.  
 
At the same time, hope that this depoliticisation strategy would shield the Major 
leadership from the unpopular consequences of ERM membership did not materialise. 
What was notable about the House of Commons debate that followed Black 
Wednesday was the ill-disguised distaste at Major’s attempt to off-load responsibility 
for failure onto the so-called ‘fault-lines’ of the system. For example, Budgen wanted 
to know why, bearing in mind ERM membership had been discussed exhaustively in 
the 1980s, it had taken Major until September 1992 to discover these fault-lines 
(Hansard (Commons) Vol. 212, 24 September, 1992: col. 6). A number of other 
Conservative backbenchers refused to condemn Germany for Britain’s plight. Policy-
makers in Bonn were only following their own legitimate national interest (see the 
contributions by Biffen, col. 34; Watts, col.40; Baker, col. 57; Townend, col.73). 
Lamont makes a similar observation concerning the reaction of the media: ‘For the 
British press, this was a British crisis caused by stupid British politicians, particularly 
myself’ (Lamont, 1999, p.270). 
 
It is one thing to create an impression that the policy-making community is isolated 
and unreceptive to the demands of the public. For policy to become controversial, this 
impression also becomes the subject of critical comment, at least within the 
Westminster village. That this was the case is most obviously manifest in the 
discourse of the Conservative Euro-sceptics as it developed in the 1990s. Of most 
interest here was the argument that Europeanisation could undermine the democratic 
legitimacy of the British political class. This case ran crudely as follows. For 
democracy to exist, the people must feel that they are properly represented in the 
institutions that govern their lives. For this to happen, they must feel that their 
representatives are genuinely in authority, even if they are not totally in control of 
policy. At the same time, the public must have effective sanctions to impose their will 
if they are unsatisfied with the performance of a particular government. The problem 
with ERM membership was that it had exposed the unrepresentative and 
unaccountable nature of elite rule in graphic terms. Euro-sceptics feared that 
Europeanisation would produce a real public backlash against British politicians who 
would become little more than ‘lightening conductors’ for popular frustration and   14 
discontent (Buller, 2000, pp.157-63). Whether this argument had any validity or not is 
of less importance. What mattered was that it was articulated and gained a certain 
currency at this time. Chris Gill, speaking in a House of Commons debate on the 
Maastricht Treaty probably best sums up the message: 
 
stripped of power to influence or decide matters of state, we shall have created 
the classic recipe for failure: responsibility resting with a body of people who do 
not have the authority to discharge that responsibility in full measure. This will 
result in public disillusionment with politicians and with people’s capacity to 
obtain satisfaction through their elected representatives. In the fullness of time 
that disillusionment will turn to frustration and anger, which will lead ultimately 
to the rejection of established political leadership, traditional party loyalties and 
the whole body politic (Hansard (Commons), vol. 201, 18 December, 1991, col. 
415). 
 
 
The Blair Government’s and the Re-nationalisation of Monetary Policy: the 
‘Democratic’ Limitations of Depoliticisation through Europeanisation.  
 
What, if any, is the connection between this past experience of Europeanisation and 
the present monetary policy of the Blair Government? Perhaps the first point to note is 
that depoliticisation remains an important governance objective for the Labour 
leadership (see for example, Brown, 1997; Balls, 1998; Robinson, 2000; Balls 2002). 
However, the policy chosen to support this objective is once again ‘domesticist’ in its 
orientation. Put in different terms, the process of placing at one remove the political 
character of decision-making in monetary policy has been achieved through the 
granting of independence to the Bank of England. Several features of this institutional 
reform are worth noting in the context of the argument developed below. First, this 
independence is operational. The Chancellor remains responsible for formulating the 
objectives of monetary policy (in this case an inflation target of 2.5%), whereas a new 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of independent experts is charged with 
implementing this goal. Second, this inflation target is symmetrical. Deviation either 
side of 2.5% is looked on unfavourable by the Treasury. Finally, the minutes as well 
as the individual voting records of the MPC are published shortly after each meeting.    15 
 
At the same time, this depoliticisation of monetary policy has been buttressed by the 
development of two rules designed to remove suspicion of political interference in 
fiscal policy. The ‘Golden Rule’ states that on average, over the economic cycle, the 
government will only borrow to invest and not to fund current spending. The 
Sustainable Debt rule stipulates that debt will be held over the economic cycle at a 
‘stable and prudent’ level. Some critics have highlighted problems with this 
framework. It is acknowledged that there are real methodological difficulties in 
measuring the beginning and end of an economic cycle. In this context, it is feared 
that the Treasury will end up defining the economic cycle in a way that suits its own 
policy purposes. The question then becomes: how much of a discipline do these rules 
really represent (Portillo, 2000; Howard, 2002)? The Treasury has responded by 
arguing that these rules maintain a sensible balance between economic stability on the 
one hand and flexibility to vary policy between years. In other words, rules are 
important, but they can be too tight. It is not for nothing that this framework has been 
labelled ‘constrained discretion’ (HM Treasury, 2002; Glyn & Wood, 2001).  
 
That said, the adoption of this domestic monetary framework was in no sense pre-
determined or inevitable. An alternative policy support which appears to be just as 
suitable for this depoliticisation strategy is sterling’s membership of the euro. 
Responsibility for monetary policy would still be devolved onto an independent 
central bank. Indeed, the independence of the ECB is enshrined in EU law. Under 
Article 107 of the Maastricht Treaty, it is explicitly forbidden from taking any 
instructions from any other organisation or body. At the same time, the Growth and 
Stability Pact has rules designed to prevent national politicians from manipulating 
fiscal policy in a way which affects the maintenance of price stability in the eurozone. 
In particular, a government’s budget deficit should be close to balance or surplus and 
certainly not exceed 3% of GDP (although recent revisions to this policy in November 
2002 specify that this position will be judged over the economic cycle). At the same 
time, a country’s ratio of government debt to GDP should not exceed 60% (Radice, 
2003). 
 
So why has the Blair Government (or more accurately the Treasury under Brown’s 
stewardship) presided over what might be termed the re-nationalisation of British   16 
monetary policy? After all, the government has explicitly stated on a number of 
occasions that there is no constitutional or political bar to membership of the euro. We 
might add that such a policy would certainly fit in with Blair’s more general desire for 
Britain to be playing a leading role in Europe. Of course, there are the five economic 
tests (allegedly drawn up by Brown and Balls in the back of a taxi). However, a 
consensus has developed behind the view that they are too broad (and indeed, too 
partial) to provide anything other than a smokescreen behind which a decision will be 
taken for other reasons. Instead, the argument below asserts (in rather speculative 
fashion) that further Europeanisation of monetary policy has been halted because of 
concerns about a ‘democratic deficit’ in the institutions governing the eurozone. Put 
more accurately perhaps, it is felt that the Treasury’s domestic monetary framework is 
better at disguising the undemocratic and elitist nature of the depoliticisation strategy 
that it is supporting.  
 
More particularly, there are three institutional properties of the eurozone which, at 
present, threaten to undermine the democratic legitimacy of any future 
depoliticisation (through Europeanisation) strategy. The first is the legal mandate of 
the ECB. As already noted, depoliticisation represents the act of placing at one 
remove the political character of decision-making. However, if ‘Black Wednesday’ 
conferred one lesson on policy-makers in the Treasury, it was ensuring that the 
mechanisms of depoliticisation are conditional and reversible if politicians become 
unhappy with the results. The problem with the current structure of the ECB is that it 
is too independent. Not only is this status entrenched in EU law, changing it is likely 
to prove difficult, as such an act would requite a unanimous vote at an 
Intergovernmental Conference. Moreover, as we have already seen, it is not 
guaranteed that British politicians will be able to off-load blame onto EU institutions 
if things go wrong. If legitimacy is to work in this context, other actors that are 
affected by the policies of the ECB will require a general stake in these arrangements 
(De Grawe, 1998; see also Currie, 1997; Financial Times, 19 December, 2001; 10 
June, 2003). 
 
A second institutional property which is perceived to affect the legitimacy of 
Europeanisation in this area is the goal independence of the ECB. As already noted, 
the ECB is responsible for implementing monetary policy in the eurozone. Where the   17 
Bank is different is that it has a policy formulation role as well. Whereas Article 105 
of the Maastricht Treaty states that the prime objective of the ECB is the maintenance 
of price stability, no numerical target for the level of inflation is specified. Initially, 
the Bank committed itself to an asymmetrical figure of 2% or less, although this has 
recently been revised to ‘close to, but below 2%’ (Financial Times, 9 May 2003). One 
problem with such a goal is that, unlike the Treasury’s symmetrical target, it runs the 
risk of producing policy with a deflationary bias. More fundamentally, as long as the 
ECB retains this goal independence, it will be judged not only on its inflation record, 
but also on its success in balancing the requirements of price stability with the need to 
maintain and expand industrial output and employment. Failure to manage this trade-
off successfully may provoke criticism from member states and the legitimacy of the 
ECB will suffer. Indeed, evidence of such discontent already exists as France and 
Germany have publicly exhorted the ECB to cut eurozone interest rates further in 
response to sluggish economic growth (Islam, 2003). 
 
Finally (and perhaps most obviously) the ECB’s lack of openness and transparency is 
also perceived by the Treasury to undermine is legitimacy. The ECB does not publish 
the minutes of its meetings until 16 years after the event. Instead, it provides a 
monthly report at a press conference which highlights the reasons for (what is 
presented as) a majority decision and the consensus surrounding it. Of more 
significance perhaps is the fact that national oriented representation on the Bank’s 
decision-making machinery almost compels this secrecy. Members of the Executive 
Board are appointed through the common accord of member states after consultation 
with the European Parliament. Similarly, remaining members of the Governing Board 
(which includes the Executive Board) are national bank governors of all countries in 
the Single Currency. While the legal nature of the ECB is supposed to guarantee its 
freedom from political interference, this national orientated representation highlights 
the possibility that policy outcomes maybe susceptible to national political lobbying 
(the Duisenberg/Trichet episode being an obvious case in point). To publish the 
minutes and voting records of Governing Council meetings runs the risk of exposing 
national divisions and fuelling speculation about the relative influence of particular 
member governments. In recent evidence to the Treasury Select Committee, Melanie 
Johnson (Economic Secretary) appears to have accepted the argument that openness   18 
in this context may lead to the politicisation of eurozone monetary policy (HM 
Treasury, 2000; see also Favero, 2000).  
 
If the institutional features of the eurozone are perceived to pose a threat to the 
legitimacy of any future Europeanisation of policy, the fiscal rules of the Growth and 
Stability Pact (GSP) are thought to be too rigid by the Blair Government. Treasury 
ministers and their advisers have continually argued that trying to balance the budget 
year on year could actually be damaging to the economy. Politicians could find 
themselves having to cut spending or raise taxes (or both) at the time of a recession. 
Moreover, that such measures are likely to generate domestic opprobrium and 
discontent. Indeed, it is clear that complaints about the inflexibility of the GSP from 
France, Germany and Italy stem in part from concerns about the domestic effect of 
Europeanisation in this area. Looking at these events from the outside, it is easy to see 
why Whitehall might make some sort of a connection with Black Wednesday. 
Moreover, while it is possible to case doubt on the constraining nature of the 
Treasury’s own fiscal rules, it is clear that their great merit is that they will help guard 
against the loss of autonomy that British politicians experienced on 16
th September, 
1992. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has generated three broad conclusions. First, the temporal path of 
Europeanisation in the area of monetary policy has been uneven, to the point where it 
may even be said that it has been halted at present. Second, explanations of this 
trajectory need to consider the relationship between Europeanisation as a process and 
its ‘democratic properties. It should be stressed this paper is not putting forward a 
particular definition of democracy. Nor it is arguing that the EU or Europeanisation is 
necessarily undemocratic. What it is suggesting is that British politicians understand 
that the Europeanisation process may bring with it difficult issues of accountability 
and legitimacy. This observation indicates that future research should be concerned 
not just with the ‘reality’ of Europeanisation, but also the way it is perceived. 
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